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A Model for Investigating Organizational Impact on Information Security 
Behavior 
 
Waldo Rocha Flores1 








The increased amount of attacks targeting humans accessing and using computers has 
made it significantly important to understand human and organizational behavior in attacks and 
how resilient behavior can be achieved. This paper presents a research model that attempts to 
understand how organizational and human factors complement each other in shaping information 
security behavior. The model was developed through an inductive approach, in which content 
domain experts were interviewed to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena. Common 
patterns that were identified in the interviews were then combined with data collected through 
surveying the literature. Specifically, the research model includes constructs related to the 
organization and promotion of information security, constructs related to perceptions of 
information security awareness and the social conditions within an organizational setting, and 
individual constructs related to an individual’s perceptions of attitude, normative beliefs, and 
self-efficacy. Implications for continuing research and how the model will be tested empirically 
are discussed. 
Keywords: Organization of information security; information security risks; organizational 
structures; information security awareness 
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INTRODUCTION 
The increased effectiveness and robustness of technical security components has made it 
more difficult to successfully attack computer systems using purely technical means. Many 
attackers have therefore started to attack the humans accessing and using the computer systems 
(Applegate 2009) . This development has increased the attention given to risks related to human 
or social aspects of information security. In organizational settings, typical risks against 
employees include the risk of being deceived to comply with a malicious request, e.g. execute 
malware on the computer or reveal sensitive information (Mitnick and Simon 2002). Numerous 
papers have therefore focused on describing important concepts and solutions to cope with these 
risks. The research domain is however still rather immature, and the extant socio-technical 
information security approaches have been criticized as lacking not only theoretically grounded 
methods, but also empirical evidence on their effectiveness (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010): 
only one paper examines organizational measures that are theory-based and evaluate their 
effectiveness empirically trough actual socio-technical attacks (Workman 2008). Related 
research has usually focused on investigating individual perceptions of external cues and 
properties that determine policy compliance and based their analyses on a variety of theories 
including theory of planned behavior (Bulgurcu et al. 2010), general deterrence theory (Lee et al. 
2004), and learning theory (Warkentin et al. 2011). Other related research have largely focused 
on success rates of certain types of socio-technical attacks, e.g. (Dodgejr et al. 2007), or 
analyzing characteristics that explain an individual’s susceptibility to these attacks, e.g. 
(Pattinson et al. 2012). However, the effect of key organizational constructs proposed in 
organizational and individual behavior literature, on information security has not been rigorously 
examined (Hu et al. 2012). We therefore argue that there is a need for more studies linking key 
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organizational and individual constructs to develop a better understanding of theoretical 
relationship between constructs on different levels in an organization. We further believe that it 
is important to investigate factors related to actual behavior while being under an attack, in 
addition to studies on how compliant employees are to specific policies, or estimating success 
probabilities for an attack. The purpose of this study is twofold. Firstly, we are interested in 
getting a deeper understanding of how factors complement each other in shaping information 
security behavior. Secondly, we suggest a research model that includes both organizational and 
individual constructs to investigate how organizations can shape this behavior. We attempt to 
fulfill this purpose through a combined method approach of conducting semi-structured 
interviews with content experts and surveying the literature. The result is the main contribution 
of the paper and is presented as a preliminary research model which includes a set of 
organizational and individual constructs that potentially could shape information security 
behavior. 
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section presents an overview of risks 
related to insecure behavior and influences on information security behavior. The section that 
follows presents the methodology for conducting the interviews. The findings from the combined 
method approach is then presented and discussed. The paper concludes with a summarization of 
this study’s findings together with both the preliminary research model and a description of 
implications for the continuing research 
SHAPING INFORMATION SECURITY BEHAVIOR  
The purpose of the study is to identify important constructs for developing a research 
model to investigate organizational and individual constructs, and their effectiveness in shaping 
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security behavior. However, to understand why it’s important to shape information security 
behavior, the risks related to insecure behavior are first described.  
Risks Related to Insecure Behavior 
In this study, the focus is on risks that could be realized through an attack exploiting 
insecure behavior of an employee. Behavior that could be exploited include careless use of 
email, computer passwords, use and disposal of computers, portable storage drives and other 
hardware that can either contain sensitive information or spread malware, lack of precaution 
when visiting suspicious websites or installing software, or falling victim to manipulative 
techniques and comply to a malicious request. In this study we have examined insecure behavior 
related to four attacks. These attacks are now further described. 
Phishing is an attack described as the marriage between technology and social 
engineering in which attackers use spoofed email messages to trick end-users into taking a 
suggested action that benefits the attacker (Nohlberg and Kowalski 2008). For instance, the 
attacker can convince end-users to reply with sensitive information such as user credentials or 
click on a malicious link where the attacker either: i) automatically introduce malware by 
exploiting vulnerabilities in the web browser (e.g. drive by download) or ii) persuade end-users 
to execute malware on their computers. Malware can also be executed through hidden scripts in 
attached documents.  
In a Physical intrusion an attacker enters a target organization and try to obtain 
information by impersonate a legitimate party such as an employee, visitor, or service personnel 
using false credentials or a good story. Thus easily bypass any technical or physical defenses 
(Mitnick and Simon 2002). Once inside the target organization, the attacker can look for 
sensitive or even classified information by going through the trashes (so called dumpster diving), 
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the office landscape (so called desktop hacking), or look over an employee’s shoulder to acquire 
passwords or pin numbers (so called shoulder surfing).  
An attacker can also use the phone to impersonate someone in a position of authority and 
target someone less educated in the area of security (e.g. help desk employees) to increase the 
information competence in the preparation for another, more valuable attack. When possible, the 
attacker can also use this attack method to persuade the victim to reveal sensitive information 
over the phone. We refer this type of attack as Phone fraud (Mitnick and Simon 2002). 
Malware trough portable media is a practice of using a combination of technical and 
social attack methods. For instance, an attacker can leave a USB memory stick, or a CD with a 
tempting text, outside a building, to entice a victim’s curiosity into using the item in their 
computer (Nohlberg and Kowalski 2008). 
Influences on Information Security Behavior 
To gain a general understating of the potential influences on information security 
behavior, related literature was first consolidated. This process resulted in an the understanding 
that a behavior can be affected by an individual’s attitude towards information security, 
normative beliefs about information security, and perceived knowledge of the topic, i.e. self-
efficacy (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). These factors can further be influenced by the shared beliefs, and 
relationships between employees (Hu et al. 2012), and perceptions of the organizational 
information security policies, practices, and procedures (Chan et al. 2005). These social structure 
perceptions can potentially be influenced by management actions that promote good information 
security practices through clear direction, and provide knowledge of what is necessary for 
managing information security risks (R. von Solms and B. von Solms 2006). These actions can 
be deployed trough security structures, processes and transferring mechanisms. Organizational 
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structures involve the existence of responsible functions such as senior-level information security 
executives and a diversity of coordinating committees (Kayworth and Whitten 2010). The 
structure of clear and unambiguous definitions of the roles and responsibilities of the involved 
parties throughout the whole organization are prerequisites for effective information security. 
Security processes refer to the strategic- and operational decision-making and monitoring of 
security performance. However, even if processes and the above mentioned structures are in 
place, it is possible that the information security efforts are not aligned with the business 
strategy, environment and needs, and thus are ineffective. It is therefore crucial that also 
knowledge transferring mechanisms are deployed in an organization.  
The theoretical linkages provide a base for exploring the impact of various socio-
technical factors required to shape employee information security behavior. As this specific 
linkage has not been rigorously examined, a deeper understanding of the domain is first required. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In developing a research model, MacKenzie et al. (2011) suggested that after gaining a 
general understating of the domain, interviews using an inductive approach with content experts 
should be conducted. Through the interview process, common patterns emerge and the 
researcher then begins to search for literature which is treated as additional data, and compare 
this data with the emerged patterns from the interviews (Trochim and Donnelly 2006). Six semi 
structured interviews were utilized in order to capture rich, detailed information on content 
experts’ views of the investigated domain in general, and factors to shape an employee’s 
behavior when dealing with actual socio-technical attacks in particular. The number of 
respondents was decided due to the following reasons: i) the study is of exploratory nature, and 
ii) the last interview did not produce any new radical insights into the content experts’ view of 
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the domain. The latter argument is given support by the literature recommending that interview 
data should be collected until theoretical saturation take place and a too high number of 
respondents will make thorough interpretations of the interviews difficult (Kvale 1986).  
Data Collection 
The interviews were carried out from February 2012 to June 2012. All respondents had 
acquired a deep domain specific knowledge trough experience of the topic on a regular basis. 
Two of the respondents were academics, but both have many years of practical experience in the 
domain. The four practitioners were selected on recommendations, and have worked extensively 
within the investigated domain. The data of respondents is summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1. Respondent data 
Respondent Position Experience (Years) 
Time 
(Hours) 
1 Professor and scientist (private industry) >15 1 
2 Senior Consultant 16 1.5 
3 Consultant 5 1.5 
4 Head of Security (private industry) 12 2.5 
5 Associate professor and practitioner >10 2 
6 Senior security researcher (private industry) >15 1 
 
Three of the interviews were carried out face-to-face at the expert’s respective places of 
business, and three were carried out over telephone due to geographical concerns. The interviews 
were audio-recorded and transcribed. Handwritten notes were also taken the interviewer and 
transcribed electronically. The interviews all had the same general approach, and consisted of 
two main objectives: (i) to gain a deeper understanding of important concepts for shaping 
information security behavior and (ii) to discuss potential relationships between constructs 
towards developing the model to investigate antecedents of information security behavior. In 
terms of important constructs, we explicitly asked for opinions on constructs related to actual 
behavior while being under a socio-technical attack, i.e., if these affect the outcome of attacks. 
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Due to the complexity of acquiring data on how organizational and individual variables 
complement each other in shaping information security behavior effort was spent to enforce 
reliability of results. That is, the original layout and scope of the interviews was somewhat 
changed according to the focus area(s) of the respondents. For example, no answers were forced, 
and the respondents were allowed to discuss a particular area in greater detail. As a consequence, 
more time was spent on those matters the respondents perceived to be of greater importance for 
the topic of the study. The first part of the interview described the topic of the study and the 
outline of the event. The second part concerned risks that could exploit insecure behavior. The 
third part concerned potential constructs on both an organizational and individual level that 
influence information security behavior. The final part concerned potential relationship between 
organizational and individual constructs in order to shape information security behavior.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSSION 
This section reports of the combined method approach using data from interviews and 
from the literature. The constructs were classified as follows. Constructs categorized as 
organizational constructs (See Table 2) are related to the organization and promotion of 
information security. Individual constructs (See Table 3) are related either to perceptions of 
information security awareness and the social conditions within an organizational setting (also 
referred to as mediators in Table 1 and Figure 1, for example) as perceived by end-users or to an 
individual’s attributes that influence information security behavior (also referred to as 
motivational constructs in Figure 1 for example and comprising attitude, normative beliefs, and 
self-efficacy).  
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Five broad organizational constructs were emerged from the analysis of the combined 
data and presented in the Table 2 and illustrated in the research model (See Figure 1). In the 
following, the constructs are discussed and the sources are specified. 
Table 2. Organizational constructs 
Construct Key Aspects 





Information Security Processes 
Security Knowledge Transfer 
 
Shared Organizational Security 
Knowledge 
Security Visions, Provide Role Model, Foster 
Cooperation Towards Common goals, Set High 
Performance Expectations 
Formal Security Unit, CISO, Steering Committee, Well-
defined Information Security Responsibilities 
Information Security Planning, Performance Monitoring 
Training on Policies, Threat Awareness, Informal 
training, IT-based training 
Security Awareness of Business Managers, Business 
Awareness of Security Personnel 
 
The importance of leadership was acknowledged early in the interviews. Respondent 1 
argued as follows. 
“All kinds of measures can be implemented and employees can be trained, but without 
strong leadership to educate business unit managers and security personnel, measures will 
not be effective. Strong leadership gives effective operational measures.” 
Trough leadership, the importance of protecting information assets should be articulated, 
and the leader should provide a role model for employees to follow, foster cooperation towards 
common goals, and set performance expectations (Podsakoff et al. 1990).  
The respondents agreed that structures are needed to facilitate the deployment of security 
efforts, and communication between leaders, security personnel, and business representatives. 
The literature also acknowledge the importance of structures for deploying management actions 
and leadership (Van Grembergen and De Haes 2008). Key aspects of the organizational 
structures identified in this study are: formal security unit, an executive with information security 
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as the main responsibility, the establishment of a committee comprised of business and security 
personnel, and well-defined responsibilities (Kayworth and Whitten 2010).  
Formal processes to develop policies, plan the implementation of security controls (e.g. 
end-user training) and monitor the effectiveness of implemented controls were acknowledge as 
crucial. Ongoing knowledge sharing is crucial to establish understanding and alignment between 
business and IT managers (Van Grembergen and De Haes 2008). By using mechanisms such as 
security education and cross-training, shared security knowledge can be achieved among 
managers and employees can understand what is expected of them, and how to protect 
themselves from security risks. Respondent 2 and Respondent 3 shared the following. 
“The operational personnel need to know what is expected of them. The persons at the 
highest level of the organization need to communicate directives to operational personnel 
so that they know why security measures are important, how to implement them, and why.” 
 “Business managers need to understand the importance of information security and 
understand how it can be used to support the business and not hinder it. On the other hand 
security mangers also need to understand the business and the end-user for developing 
security policies and programs that focuses on the end-users perspective.” 
Capturing and transferring the security knowledge to increase end-user awareness and 
shape their behavior is usually conducted through formal awareness education and training 
programs, workshops, lectures or through IT-based training tools. However, both the experts and 
the literature argue that it is not enough to merely have formal knowledge transferring processes 
in place – the management needs to assure and monitor that the users have comprehended the 
knowledge for it to be truly effective (Barrett 2003). This could be done through implementing 
regular security exercises using weaker forms of penetration tests. These exercises reinforce the 
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training and education programs. It also keeps the users alert, and more prepared in the occasion 
of an actual socio-technical attack (Nohlberg and Kowalski 2008). 
Three broad constructs, working as mediators for an individual’s motivation towards 
behaving secure (i.e. attitude, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy), were emerged from the 
analysis of the combined data. These are presented in the Table 3 and illustrated in the research 
model (See Figure 1). 
Table 3. Mediators 








Perceived Social Culture 
Perceived Learning Environment 
Public information policy  
Internet use policy  
Installation policy 
Written information policy 
Hardware disposal policy 
Communication policy 
Call-back policy 
Shared Beliefs, Shared Goals, Social Relationships 
Perceived Support, Verbal Feedback, Vicarious experience 
 
Policies are used as formal directives, and are crucial to manage socio-technical risks by 
shaping employee behavior that is conducive to the protection of information assets (Da Veiga 
and Eloff 2010). How effective the policy is, depends on how well the employees accept the 
policy, i.e. how well the policy fit to the culture of the organization. Respondent 4 shared the 
following. 
“There are individuals in an organization that behave insecurely regardless of formal 
organizational directives. It is difficult to shape individual behavior, it is therefore 
important to shape an organization, and by doing so employees will be influenced by each 
other. For instance, by looking at how colleagues behave the behavior of a single 
employee can potentially be influenced”. 
Respondent 5 shared the following. 
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“You can implement a thousand polices, but they will not be accepted if they don’t fit to the 
cultural environment within the organization. Some policies might be more accepted by 
employees working in military and civilian government facilities, and international 
airports, while employees at a local construction company might strongly reject the same 
policy if they find it irrelevant with regards to the type of environment they work in.” 
Punishment is thought to not be effective. Respondent 4 and respondent 5 shared the following. 
“I don’t believe punishment is effective. You should talk with your employees and teach 
them how to prevent incidents. There should be a supportive environment in the 
organization, not a punishment oriented.” 
 “Using disciplinary measures only creates a negative feeling which can affect the 
productivity and motivation of the employees. Employees complying with a request from a 
malicious perpetrator in good faith shouldn’t be punished.” 
The comments indicate that efforts should be directed to encourage employees towards 
security-savvy behavior. All six respondents contributed to the identification of specific policies 
to shape information security behavior. Polices recommended by the experts and the litterateur 
are described as follows. Policies can regulate that only generic information should be listed on 
publicly available sources, that employee Internet usage is restricted (e.g. usage of social 
network sites during work hours), and that additional software installation privileges are 
restricted (Da Veiga and Eloff 2010). Policies can also address the acceptable use and disposal of 
sensitive information written on paper, and the acceptable use and disposal of hardware that can 
contain sensitive information (Peltier 2006). Awareness of policies addressing information that 
can be communicated, how it can be communicated, to whom and under what conditions is also 
believed to influence information security behavior (Dontamsetti and Naranayan 2009). Finally, 
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employees should be informed that whenever any questionable request is made by phone, they 
should call back and check that the number belongs to someone with suitable authorization 
(Nohlberg and Kowalski 2008). The importance of social structures, culture and an environment 
that encourage learning was acknowledged by the respondents. Respondent 4 and respondent 5 
discussed these aspects thoroughly, and from the literature key aspects related to social culture 
(Chow and Chan 2008) and learning environment were identified  (Warkentin et al. 2011). 
SUMMARY AND CONLUSION 
We attained a deeper understanding of how factors complement each other in shaping 
information security behavior. Furthermore, a research model that includes both organizational 
and individual constructs to shape this behavior is suggested (See Figure 1). To test the research 
model, empirical data will be collected using the key informant methodology in which 
respondents will be chosen based on their position, experience and professional knowledge. Data 
will be collected from two key-informants per organization – one from the security organization 
with a role such as: Chief Information Officer, IT Manager, Chief Information Security Officer, 
and Security Officer, and one with a role that include regular utilization of information 
technology products and services, e.g. computers, Internet access, electronic mail, etc. (at least 
ten respondents per organization). Hypothesis related to the research model will be tested using 
structural equation modeling. To assure the validation of the measurement instrument, the 
conceptual domain of the included constructs will firstly be defined as recommended by 
(MacKenzie et al. 2011). Then, items to capture the constructs will be generated, and the content 
validity of the items will be assessed. After formally specifying a measurement model, empirical 
data will be collected from convenience samples through two pilot surveys. To measure actual 
behavior while being under a socio-technical attack, we are currently conducting several 
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experiments. Quantitative data is being collected through several case studies using a scenario-
based survey and unannounced phishing experiments. As a scenario-based survey is planned to 
be used for measuring information security behavior in the empirical study, the usefulness of a 
scenario-based survey to assess information security behavior will be evaluated by comparing 
the results from both methodology approaches. Finally, the validated research model will be set 
to the test through collection of data from Swedish organizations. 
 
Organizational constructs Motivational constructsMediatiors






















Figure 1. Preliminary research model 
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